THE  SAflR  BASIN  GOVERNING  COMMISSION 


BY 

F.  M.  RUSSELL 


REPRINTED  FROM  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  QUARTERLY 
Vol.  XXXVI,  No.  2,  June,  1921 


NEW  YORK 

PUBLISHED  BY  THE 

ACADEMY  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

1921 


THE  8AAR  BASIN  GOVERNING  COMMISSION 


BY 

F.  M.  RUSSELL 


•  •    »    »    •  •••^•^  ••,  »^  *  •   J 


REPRINTED  FROM  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  QUARTERLY 
Vol.  XXXVI,  No.  2,  June,  1921 


NEW  YORK 

PUBLISHED  BY  THE 

ACADEMY  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

1921 


'Ijli'ilwll. 


•  •  •   .  • 


8UK,  INT£Rr^Ar.i;,w.u  K.u..n«*IS 


THE  SAAR  BASIN  GOVERNING  COMMISSION 

THE  Treaty  of  Versailles  is  beginning  to  bear  fruit,  and 
by  its  fruits  it  may  be  judged.  At  this  date  its  friends 
can  hardly  maintain  that  all  the  fruit  is  sweet,  neither 
may  its  enemies  assert  that  the  yield  is  uniformly  bitter.  It  is 
now  incumbent  on  those  who  would  foster  international  under- 
standing and  progress  to  study  the  treaty  in  the  light  of  its 
actual  application  rather  than  from  the  viewpoint  of  precon- 
ceived theory. 

This  paper  aims  to  present  a  preliminary  survey  of  the  initial 
steps  in  the  application  of  one  section  of  the  treaty,  that  con- 
cerning the  Saar  Basin.  Such  a  survey  is  possible  at  this  time 
because  the  Saar  Basin  Governing  Commission  provided  for  by, 
the  Treaty  has  been  officially  functioning  since  February  21, 
1920,  and  has  given  an  account  of  its  stewardship  in  frequent 
detailed  reports." 

To  understand  the  reason  for  the  decision  to  establish  this 
commission,  and  to  comprehend  the  peculiarly  difficult  tasks 
confronting  it,  certain  facts  relative  to  the  Saar  Basin  and  its 
importance  to  France  and  Germany  must  be  stated.  The  dis- 
trict over  which  the  commission  was  given  authority  includes 
about  700  square  miles  of  territory  contiguous  to  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  with  a  population  of  about  650,000  inhabitants.'* 
It  was  formerly  part  of  Germany  and  the  population  is  over- 

^  These  reports  appear  in  the  League  of  Nations  Official  Journal^  the  officia 
record  of  the  activities  of  the  League  of  Nations,  published  by  Messrs.  Harrison 
and  Sons,  Ltd.,  45  St.  Martin's  Lane,  London,  W.  C. 

'  Haskins  and  Lord,  Some  Problems  of  the  Peace  Conference^  p.  146. 

169 


963925 


I70  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  QUARTERLY        [Vol.  XXXVI 

whelmingly  German  in  ethnic  composition  and  in  sentiment. 
At  least  in  p^rt,  however,  the  territory  had  been  in  French 
hands  at  one  time  or  another,  and  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war 
in  191 8  the  French  were  in  a  position  to  urge  consideration  of 
this  fact  as  a  foundation  for  their  claim  to  the  territory.^ 

Far  more  significant,  in  the  writer's  judgment,  in  explaining 
the  attitude  of  the  French  government  regarding  the  Saar,  are 
the  following  economic  facts.  The  Saar  is  principally  a  coal- 
producing  region.  Its  output  in  191 3  was  about  18,000,000 
tons,  and  the  production  would  have  been  larger  but  for  the 
fact  that  the  German  government  preferred  to  spend  a  greater 
amount  of  energy  in  developing  the  mines  of  the  Westphalian 
district.''  The  annual  surplus  available  for  export  was  between 
9,000,000  and  10,000,000  tons.  On  the  other  hand  the  coal 
resources  of  France  are  not  great  enough  to  supply  French 
industry.  As  her  entire  production  in  191 3  was  but  41,000,000 
tons,  it  was  necessary  to  import  22,000,000  tons  in  order  to 
satisfy  her  requirements.^  Indeed,  it  has  been  estimated  that 
the  total  underground  coal  resources  of  France  are  less  than 
those  of  the  Saar.-^ 

The  coal  problem  of  France  was  aggravated  by  the  recovery 
of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  for  these  provinces  with  their  thriving 
industries  consumed  about  three  times  more  coal  than  they 
produced.  Consequently  France  would  be  even  more  depend- 
ent on  foreign  countries  in  the  future  than  she  had  been  in  the 
past  for  this  basic  industrial  necessity.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  a  desire  to  avoid  such  dependence  was  a  strong  motive 
underlying  the  French  demands  for  the  Saar  Basin.s 

During  the  war  the  political  control  of  this  region  seems  to 
have  been  cherished  as  one  of  the  secret  war  aims  of  France.^ 

^  Haskins  and  Lord,  op.  cit.^  pp.  132-139,  for  a  brief  discussion  of  historical 
claims  of  France. 

'Historical  Section  of  the  (British)  Foreign  Office,  Handbook  No.  31,  Lorraine 
and  Saar  Mine  Fields  (London,  H.  M.  Stationery  Office,  1920),  p.  9. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  25.  *  Haskins  and  Lord,  op.  cit.,  p.  141. 
'L.  Barthou,  Le  Traitk  de  Paix  (Paris,  E.  Fasquelle,  1919),  pp.  108-9. 

•  See  TVirw  £«ro/^,  December  20,  1917,  Supplement,  for  alleged  secret  corres- 
pondence between  France  and  Russia,  published  by  the  Bolshevist  government  in 
November,  191 7. 


No.  2]  THE  SAAR  BASIN  GOVERNING  COMMISSION  171 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  struggle  the  French  made  an  official 
demand  for  the  territory,  but  at  first  mainly  on  strategic 
grounds.  Later,  at  the  Peace  Conference,  the  more  effective 
argument  was  advanced  that  the  Germans,  ha^mg^flooded^arxl 
rendered  unproductive  the  French  coal-  minqs,,  should  make 
reparation  in  kind  by  surrendering  the  Saa^f  <:Oc3ilepot5its- and 
the  Saar  territory  to  France.'  This  proposal  not  only  aroused 
bitter  opposition  in  Germany  but  seems  to  have  met  with  dis- 
approval in  the  Peace  Conference  itself  on  the  ground  that  it 
did  violence  to  the  principle  of  self-determination. 

A  compromise,  however,  was  eventually  agreed  upon  by 
which  apparently  the  partisans  of  self-determination  were  satis- 
fied that  their  principle  had  been  upheld  and  at  the  same  time 
France^  obtained  substantially  what  she  wanted.  The  agree- 
ment was  that  Germany  should  cede  to  France  "■  in  full  and 
absolute  possession "  the  coal  mines  of  the  Saar  Basin.''  If, 
however,  Germany  were  allowed  to  retain  political  control  over 
the  district,  it  would  be  possible  for  her,  so  the  French  feared, 
in  spite  of  treaty  provisions,  to  obstruct  the  exploitation  of  the 
mines.3  Ostensibly  to  avoid  this  danger  it  was  decided  to 
intrust  the  League  of  Nations  with  the  government  of  the 
Territory  for  a  period  of  fifteen  years.  At  the  expiration  of 
this  time  the  inhabitants  were  to  be  given  an  opportunity  to  **  in- 
dicate the  sovereignty  under  which  they  desire  to  be  placed."* 

The  treaty  provided  that  the  actual  government  of  the  Saar 
should  be  vested  in  a  commission  of  five  members,  which  was 
to  sit  in  the  Territory  and  act  as  the  representative  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  The  commission  was  to  be  appointed  by 
the  Council  of  the  League ;  the  members  were  to  hold  office 
for  one  year,  although  subject  to  removal  at  any  time  by  the 
Council,  and  they  might  be  reappointed.  One  of  the  members 
of  the  commission  must  be  a  citizen  of  France  and  one  a  native 
inhabitant  of  the  Saar.     The  other  three  members  must  belong 

^Ne-iV  York  Times^  March  29,  1919.     For  a  more  complete  discussion  of  French 
motives,  see  Buell,  Contemporary  French  Politics,  p.  416  et  seq. 

*  Treaty  of  Versailles,  art.  45. 
^  Barthou,  op.  cit.,  p.  no. 

*  Treaty  of  Versailles,  art.  49. 


172  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  QUARTERLY        [Vol.  XXXVI 

to  three  cpuntries  other  than  France  or  Germany.^  Under  this 
arrangement  the  two  peoples  most  vitally  interested  and  directly 
affected-^^the  French  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  Saar — were 
eajch  assurpcj  pner.ni^mber  on  the  Governing  Commission.  On 
the  other  hand  the  majority  of  the  commission  would,  theo- 
r«^{icd:ly,  reflef:t  ^a /.more  neutral  viewpoint  and  therefore  pre- 
sumably be  more  truly  representative  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
Their  view,  too,  would  prevail  on  any  matter  upon  which  they 
were  agreed,  for  the  treaty  stipulated  that  the  commission  was 
to  reach  its  decisions  by  majority  vote.'' 

In  view  of  all  the  circumstances  leading  to  the  decision  to 
intrust  the  government  of  this  territory  to  the  League  of 
Nations,  a  mixed  commission  of  at  least  five  members  was 
probably  the  best  solution.  Experience,  it  is  true,  has  demon- 
strated that  impartiality  is  often  purchased  at  the  cost  of  effi- 
ciency when  the  members  of  a  mixed  commission  are  drawn 
from  nations  which  differ  more  or  less  widely  in  language  as 
well  as  in  political,  legal  and  social  ideas  and  institutions. 
Moreover,  such  a  commission  may  prove  to  be  dangerously 
susceptible  to  the  evil  forces  of  suspicion  and  intrigue.  With 
the  appointment  of  all  the  members,  however,  in  the  control  of 
one  body — the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations — and  with 
the  members  responsible  to  that  body  alone,  these  difficulties 
might  be  greatly  reduced,  if  not  eliminated,  by  a  skilful  selec- 
tion of  the  personnel  of  the  commission. 

The  Governing  Commission  was  given  "  all  the  powers  of 
government  hitherto  belonging  to  the  German  Empire,  Prussia, 
or  Bavaria  .  .  ."3  Specifically,  it  could  appoint  and  dismiss 
public  officials,  "  create  such  administrative  and  representative 
bodies  as  it  may  deem  necessary",  administer  and  operate  the 
railways  and  canals  and  different  public  services,  and  even  fix 
the  conrditions  and  hours  of  labor  for  men,  women  and  children 
in  the  Territory.     It  also  had  the  sole  power  of  levying  taxes 

and  dues.     Not  only  was  it  empowered   to   set  up  a  civil  and 

/ 

*  Treaty  of  Versailles,  Part  III,  Sec.  4,  Annex,  paragraphs  16-17. 

*  Ibid.^  paragraph  19. 

* /JiV/. ,  paragraphs  19-33,  for  an  enumeration  of  the  powers  of  the  Governing 
Commission. 


No.  2]  THE  SAAR  BASIN  GOVERNING  COMMISSION  173 

criminal  court  to  hear  appeals  from  the  existing  territorial 
courts,  and  to  exercise  original  jurisdiction  in  -certain  cases  for 
which  it  should  decide  the  existing  courts  were  incompetent, 
but  the  commission  itself  was  made  the  tribunal  to  decide  by 
majority  vote  all  questions  arising  from  the  interpretation  of  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty  applying  to  the  Saar.  Thus  this  com- 
mission of  five  men  had  not  only  extensive  executive  powers 
but  important  legislative  and  judicial  powers  as  well. 

On  the  other  hand,  certain  legal  checks  and  limitations  on  its 
authority  were  imposed,  either  in  the  interests  of  France  or  on 
behalf  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Territory.  The  Treaty  of 
Versailles  guaranteed  France  economic  rights  and  privileges  in 
the  Saar  which  the  commission  could  not  deny,  impair  or  regu- 
late. As  we  have  seen,  the  French  state  was  given  absolute 
possession  of  the  coal  mines.^  Furthermore,  the  French  cus- 
toms regime  was  extended  to  the  Saar,  and  certain  trade  regu- 
lations in  the  interests  of  France  were  specifically  stipulated 
(Part  III,  Sec.  4,  Annex,  Paragraph  31).  In  addition,  French 
money  might,  at  the  option  of  France,  freely  circulate  in  the 
Territory  (Paragraph  32). 

Obviously  the  possession  of  the  sole  important  natural  re- 
source of  the  territory  carried  with  it  incalculable  power.  In 
order  to  safeguard  the  exploitation  of  this  resource,  the  treaty 
limited  in  several  ways  the  freedom  of  the  commission  to  ad- 
minister and  operate  the  transportation  and  communication 
•systems  of  the  Basin  (Paragraphs  7,  ^).  Power  to  annul  old 
mining  laws  or  enact  new  mining  legislation  was  also  restricted 
(Paragraphs  12,  23). 

The  extension  of  the  French  customs  regime  to  the  Saar 
Basin  meant  not  only  a  limitation  on  the  commission's  taxing 
power ;  it  meant  also  that  France  was  given  power  to  promote 
or  to  hinder  the  industry  and  the  prosperity  of  the  Territory. 
The  commission's  weakness  in  the  economic  sphere  was  in- 
creased by  a  similar  lack  of  legal  control  over  the  circulating 
medium.  If  the  French  could  introduce  the  franc  at  will,  they 
had    the   power    not  only  to   inject   a   disturbing  factor    into 

*  Treaty  of  Vereailles,  art.  45. 


174  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  QUARTERLY        [Vol.  XXXVI 

industry,  but  also  to  jeopardize  the  financial  policies  of  the 
commission  at  any  time. 

On  the  other  hand,  most  of  the  powers  given  the  commission 
were  limited  and  qualified  in  order  that  the  interests  and  local 
customs  of  the  inhabitants  might  be  properly  safeguarded. 
In  fixing  conditions  and  hours  of  labor  the  commission  was 
enjoined  to  have  regard  for  the  wishes  of  the  local  labor  organi- 
zations and  to  take  into  consideration  the  principles  adopted  by 
the  League  of  Nations  (Paragraph  23).  Not  only  might  the 
commission  not  impose  a  new  internal  tax  "  without  previously 
consulting  the  elected  representatives  of  the  inhabitants",  but 
it  must  apply  the  proceeds  of  taxation  exclusively  to  the  needs 
of  the  Territory  (Paragraph  26).  The  inhabitants  were  to 
retain  their  religious  liberties,  their  schools,  their  language  and 
their  local  assemblies,  under  the  control  of  the  Governing 
Commission  (Paragraph  28).  The  power  of  the  commission 
to  annul  existing  laws  that  had  not  been  enacted  as  temporary 
war  measures  was  limited  by  the  requirement  that  the  commis- 
sion must  first  consult  with  the  elected  representatives  of  the 
inhabitants  (Paragraph  23).  Furthermore,  the  commission  was 
positively  enjoined  to  provide  internal  protection  for  the  per- 
sons and  property  of  the  inhabitants  and  to  take  measures  for 
the  protection  of  their  interests  abroad  (Paragraphs  30,  21). 
No  military  service,  however, anight  be  required  or  allowed,  and 
no  fortifications  might  be  constructed  in  the  Territory  (Para- 
graph 30).  The  inhabitants  werej:hua  freed  from  this  burden 
as  long  as  they  remained  under  the  government  of  the  League. 

On  February  13, 1 920,  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations 
met  and  appointed  the  Governing  Commission.  Acting  under 
the  authorization  of  the  treaty  (Paragraph  18),  the  Council 
named  the  French  member,  M.  Rault,  as  chairman  and  execu- 
tive of  the  commission.  The  other  members  were  Alfred  von 
Boch,  landrath  of  Sarrelouis  (Sarrois),  Major  Lambert 
(Belgian),  and  Count  von  Moltke  Hvitfeldt  (Dane).'     At  this 

*  The  fifth  member  of  the  Commission,  whose  name  was  not  announced  at  the 
time,  the  CtJmmission  not  having  received  word  ofVhis  acceptance  of  the  appoint- 
ment, was  Mr.  R.  D.  Waugh,  of  Winnipeg,  Canada,  who  did  not  arrive  in  the  Ter- 
ritory until  ApW. — League  of  N'a lions  Official  Journal ^  No.  4,  p.  192. 


No.  2]  THE  SAAR  BASIN  GOVERNING  COMMISSION  175 

meeting,  also,  directions  were  adopted  for  the  guidance  of  the 
Governing  Commission.^  These  directions  not  only  restated 
general  guiding  principles  but  also  regulated  certain  matters  of 
detail  which,  though  implied  if  not  expressed  in  the  treaty  of 
peace,  the  League  as  trustee  of  the  Territory  could  scarcely 
leave  to  the  discretion  of  the  commission. 

Perhaps  no  international  commission  has  had  to  undertake  a 
more  delicate  task  or  play  a  more  difficult  r6le  than  the  Saar 
Basin  Governing  Commission.  At  the  outset  the  German  pop- 
ulation, informed  of  the  secret  correspondence  of  France  with 
Russia  concerning  the  Saar  during  the  war,  aware  of  the  French 
attitude  at  the  Peace  Conference,  and  convinced  that  the  French 
were  intriguing  to  detach  the  Rhine  provinces  from  Germany, 
were  prepared  to  consider  the  League  government  nothing  less 
than  a  "  disguised  annexation  "  of  the  territory  by  France.  At 
best  it  was  not  of  their  choosing,  but  a  government  imposed 
from  the  outside,  and  therefore  to  be  sullenly  endured  and 
covertly  sabotaged  rather  than  loyally  supported.  Feeling 
assured  of  the  moral  support  of  Germany,  the  inhabitants  could 
scarcely  be  expected  to  acquiesce  readily  in  measures  the  com- 
mission might  feel  called  upon  to  take  in  reorganizing  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  Territory.  The  commission's  responsibility  was 
indeed  a  heavy  one,  its  task  disheartening.  It  must  carry  out 
the  rigorous  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  cooperate  with 
the  French  in  their  exploitation  of  the  coal  mines,  support 
France  in  other  measures  of  economic  penetration  allowed  her 
by  the  treaty,  and  yet  convince  the  inhabitants  that  it  was  gov- 
erning in  their  interest. 

Theoretically,  the  members  of  the  commission,  both  individ- 
ually and  collectively,  would  have  powerful  incentives  to  govern 
well. '  If  the  French  member  were  inclined  to  forget  that  he 
represented  the  League  of  Nations  rather  than  France,  still  it 
would  not^  require  a  great  deal  of  astuteness  for  him  to  realize 
that  both  present  and  future  interests  of  France  would  be 
best  served  by  a  commission  animated  by  moderation  and  liber- 
ality.    For  the   most   effective  exploitation  of  the  coal  mines 

*  Z.  N.  O.  y.j  no.  2,  pp.  50^52. 


176  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  QUARTERLY        [Vol.  XXXVI 

the  willing  cooperation  of  the  inhabitants  was  imperative.  If 
the  Territory  was  to  be  prevented  from  voting  to  return  to 
Germany  at  the  end  of  the  fifteen-year  period  the  feat  could 
only  be  accomplished  by  making  the  lot  of  the  inhabitants 
pleasant  and  profitable  under  the  new  regime.'  The  three 
members  at  large  could  not  be  presumed  to  have  any  special 
interests  to  serve  that  would  conflict  with  the  desire  to  make  the 
work  of  the  commission  a  success.  It  is  true  that  the  member 
from  the  Saar,  though  he  could  scarcely  obstruct  the  work  of 
the  commission  directly,  even  if  so  minded,  could  contrive  to 
make  it  unpopular  with  the  people.  The  Council  of  the  League, 
however,  by  careful  selection  could  avoid  such  a  contingency^ 
or  remedy  an  error  of  choice  at  will.^  Indeed  the  Council  had 
this  important  power  over  the  entire  membership  of  the  com- 
mission. 

On  February  25th,  the  day  before  the  Governing  Commission 
officially  entered  Saarbriicken,  which  it  chose  as  the  seat  of  gov- 
ernment, it  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Saar, 
intended,  doubtless,  to  anticipate  and  discourage  any  inclination 
to  oppose  its  authority  as  well  as  to  announce  the  principles  by 
which  it  would  be  guided  in  its  government  of  the  Territory.^ 
The  proclamation  announced  the  determination  of  the  commis- 
sion to  carry  out  the  terms  of  the  treaty  *'  both  in  letter  and  in 
spirit ".  No  disorder  or  resistance,  passive  or  otherwise,  would 
be  tolerated.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Governing  Commission 
would  provide  protection  for  the  persons  and  property  of  the 
inhabitants  and  would  allow  them  to  retain  their  local  assemblies, 
religious  liberties,  associations,  schools  and  language.  Finally, 
the  Commission  would  be  constantly  guided  in  the  exercise  of 

*The  plebiscite  was  to  be  open  only  to  persons  over  20  years  of  age  who  had  been 
residents  in  the  Territory  at  the  date  of  the  signature  of  the  treaty,  and  therefore 
the  French,  if  so  disposed,  could  not  resort  to  *'  colonization  **  to  insure  a  favorable 
vote  (Part  III,  Sec.  4,  Annex,  paragraph  34). 

2  In  the  report  by  the  Secretary-General  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  the  First 
Assembly  of  the  League,  on  the  work  of  the  Council,  the  statement  is  made  with- 
out comment  that  M.  von  Boch  (the  Saar  member  of  the  Commission)  resigned  (no 
date)  and  that  M.  Hector  had  been  appointed  in  his  place. — Doc.  de  P Assemblies 
no-  37,  p.  23- 

'Z.  N.  0,  y.i  no.  3,  pp.  107-108,  contains  the  text  of  the  proclamation. 


No.  2]  THE  SAAR  BASIN  GOVERNING  COMMISSION  177 

its  authority  by  the  principles  of  international  cooperation  which 
actuated  the  League  of  Nations.  It  assured  the  people  that  it 
would  not  allow  them  to  be  exploited  or  to  be  underpaid  for 
their  labor  and  that  it  would  ''  concern  itself  specially  with  the 
development  of  industry  and  the  condition  of  the  workers'/. 

The  first  task  of  the  Governing  Commission,  after  the  distri- 
bution of  departments  among  the  different  members,^  was  to 
modify  and  replace  as  rapidly  as  possible  the  military  regime, 
which  was  still  as  onerous  as  ever  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  was  nearly  a  year  old.  Realizing  how 
heavily  the  military  control  bore  on  the  inhabitants  and  how 
productive  it  was  of  discontent,  the  Governing  Commission 
immediately  took  measures  calculated  to  restore  in  large  part 
the  political  and  civil  liberties  of  the  inhabitants.  It  restored 
complete  freedom  of  movement  in  the  Territory.  It  abolished 
the  military  police  courts,  asserting  in  its  report  to  the  Council 
of  the  League  of  Nations  that  ''  no  inhabitant  of  the  Saar  will 
henceforth  be  summoned  before  a  court-martial ",  and  promul- 
gated an  amnesty  ordinance  covering  sentences  which  had  been 
pronounced  by  the  military  police  courts.^  The  electoral  law 
drawn  up  by  the  commission  after  consultation  with  the  political 
parties  of  the  Territory  was  decidedly  liberal.  For  the  archaic 
Prussian  "  three-class  system  "  of  voting,  a  democratic  electoral 
regime  was  substituted,  providing  for  universal  adult  suffrage, 
the  secret  ballot  and  proportional  representation.^ 

^  L,N.  O.  y.,  no.  3,  p.  lor;  no.  4,  p.  192.  A  provisional  distribution  of 'duties 
among  the  members  was  made  in  the  absence  of  the  fifth  member.  As  revised  after 
bis  appearance  the  assignments  were  as  follov^rs : 

The  President,  M.,Rault  (French  Member)— Interior,  Foreign  Affairs,  Commer(^, 
Industry  and  Labor. 

M.  Lambert  (Belgian) — Public  Works,  Railways  and  Postal  and  Telegraphic 
Service. 

Von  Boch  (Saar) — Agriculture,  Public  Health  and  Social  Insurance. 

Von  Moltke  Hvitfeldt  (Dane) —  Public  Education,  Ecclesiastical  Affairs  and 
Justice. 

R.  D.  Waugh  (Canadian) — Finance,  Food  Control. 

'First  Report  of  the  Saar  Basin  Governing  Commission,  League  of  Nations 
Official  Journal^  no.  3,  p.  104. 

'  Second  Report  of  S.  B.  G.  C,  op.  cit.^  no.  4,  pp.  2CX3-203. 


178  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  QUARTERLY        [Vol.  XXXVI 

The  economic  situation  also  demanded  attention,  but  unfortu- 
nately in  economic  matters  the  Territory  was  at  the  mercy  of 
France  and  Germany,  and  the  Governing  Commission  could  do 
little  in  the  way  of  safeguarding  local  interests.  For  example, 
the  factories  in  the  Saar  district  were  seriously  handicapped  by 
their  inability  to  obtain  from  the  French,  who  were  now  in  pos- 
session of  the  mines,  an  adequate  supply  of  coal.^  Under  the 
terms  of  the  treaty,  however,  the  Governing  Commission  had 
no  power  to  give  domestic  needs  precedence  over  foreign  de- 
mands ;  it  could  only  insist  on  the  maintenance  of  the  "  pro- 
portion existing  in  191 3  between  the  amount  consumed  locally 
and  the  total  output  of  the  Saar  Basin."  ^ 

A  similar  impotence  on  the  part  of  the  Governing  Commis- 
sion was  exhibited  when  the  French  State  Mines  decided  to  pay 
their  employees  and  conduct  their  financial  transactions  in  francs 
instead  of  marks.  Even  the  mere  probability  that  such  a  step 
would  be  taken  had  aroused  the  keenest  apprehension  and  alarm 
in  the  Saar  Basin.  It  would  certainly  entail  an  increase  in  the 
cost  of  living,  and  it  would  almost  inevitably  cause  hardship  to 
certain  classes  among  the  inhabitants.  Yet  the  hands  of  the 
Governing  Commission  were  tied  by  the  treaty,  which  specific- 
ally permitted  the  introduction  of  French  currency,  at  the  option 
of  France.  The  commission  could  and  did  issue  a  futile  warn- 
ing that  the  change  of  currency  would  not  only  ''  compromise 
legitimate  interests,  such  as  small  unearned  incomes  and  pen- 
sions of  all  kinds  ",  but  also  arouse  political  opposition.^  Never- 
theless, the  measure  went  into  effect,  and  the  most  the  commis- 
sion could  do  was  to  mitigate  the  evil  consequences  in  some 
measure  by  regulating  prices.'^  This,  indeed,  was  done,  but 
only  after  forty  thousand  metal-workers  had  evinced  their  dis- 
satisfaction by  going  out  on  strike.^ 

Trouble  arose  with  Germany  as  well  as  with  France.     The 

*  Third  Report  of  S.  B.  G.  C,  op.  cit.^  no.  5,  p.  277. 

2  Treaty  of  Versailles,  Part  III,  Sec.  IV,  Annex,  paragraph  15. 
'Third  Report  of  S.  B.  G.  C,  L.  N.  Official  Journal,  no.  5,  p.  278. 

*  Fourth  Report  of  S.  B.  G.  C.,  op.  cit.^  no.  6,  p.  370. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  369. 


No.  2]  THE  SAAR  BASIN  GOVERNING  COMMISSION  179 

Saar  had  long  been  accustomed  to  importing  the  bulk  of  its 
foodstuffs  and  merchandise  from  Germany.  The  depreciation 
of  the  mark  in  consequence  of  the  war  only  increased  the  de- 
pendence of  the  Saar  district  on  Germany,  because  the  pur- 
chasing power  of  the  mark  was  greater  in  Germany  than  in 
France  and  other  countries.  It  was  therefore  a  severe  blow  to 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Saar  Basin  when,  on  April  10,  1920,  the 
German  government  announced  that  the  frontier  would  be  closed 
to  both  exports  and  imports.  In  this  emergency,  the  commis- 
sion sought  concessions  from  the  German  government,  and  pro- 
visionally admitted  into  the  Saarbrlicken  Chamber  of  Commerce 
a  representative  of  the  Imperial  German  Commissioner  for 
Exports  and  Imports,  with  authority  to  **  make  the  necessary 
adjustments"  with  a  view  to  facilitating  commercial  transactions 
between  Germany  and  the  Saar.^  The  steel  works  of  the  Basin 
were  compelled  to  reduce  their  output  because  the  requisite 
supply  of  coke  could  no  longer  be  obtained  from  Germany.^ 
The  partial  shutting-down  of  the  steel  works,  coming  at  a  time 
when  the  workers  were  demanding  higher  wages  to  meet  the 
increased  cost  of  living,  still  further  aggravated  the  burden  of 
economic  privation  and  social  discontent. 

In  another  direction  the  Governing  Commission  was  more 
successful.  A  French  decree  of  April  23  had  prohibited  the 
importation  of  certain  articles  into  France.  As  the  Saar  had 
been  drawn  into  the  French  customs  regime,  these  articles  pre- 
sumably were  also  barred  from  the  Saar  Basin.  It  so  happened 
that  the  list  included  food  and  other  articles  of  daily  use  which 
the  Territory  had  to  purchase  from  Germany.  Learning  of  the 
decree,  the  inhabitants  became  alarmed  and  representations  were 
made  to  the  Governing  Commission.  M.  Rault,  acting  for  the 
commission,  then  went  to  Paris  and  succeeded  in  securing  the 
assurance  that  the  decree  would  not  apply  to  the  Saar  Basin.3 

On  the  whole,  the  commission  seems  to  have  lost  few  oppor- 
tunities to  demonstrate  its  good  will  toward  the  inhabitants  of 

*  Second  Report  of  S.  B.  G.  C,  op.  cit.^  no.  4,  p.  192. 
'Third  Report  of  S.  B.  G.  C,  op.  cit.,  no.  5,  p.  277. 
*IHd.,  p.  283. 


l8o  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  QUARTERLY        [Vol.  XXXVI 

the  Territory.  Although  its  financial  condition  was  anything 
but  flourishing,  it  voted  credits  for  private  philanthropies  and 
considered  plans  to  encourage,  by  means  of  loans  without  in- 
terest, sorely  needed  housing  construction  in  Saarbriicken.^ 

From  the  very  first,  however,  the  Governing  Commission 
seems  to  have  met  with  considerable  opposition  and  suspicion. 
If  its  acts  happened  to  be  above  criticism,  its  motives  were  im- 
pugned. It  seems  to  have  faced  hostility  from  the  German 
officials,  the  teaching  profession,  the  clergy  and  the  "  higher 
industrial  and  commercial  classes."  It  encountered  open  and 
bitter  opposition  from  most  of  the  newspapers  of  the  Territory. 
This  opposition,  the  Governing  Commission  has  intimated,  was 
greatly  aggravated,  if  indeed  it  was  not  primarily  instigated,  by 
certain  organizations  financed  by  Germany.  ^^ 

Under  these  circumstances  the  Governing  Commission  soon 
receded  at  several  points  from  its  original  liberal  stand.  Al- 
though it  had  announced  that  steps  were  being  taken  for  the 
complete  restoration  of  the  liberty  of  the  press  and  had  decreed 
the  final  abolition  of  courts-martial,  it  was  soon  constrained  to 
withdraw  from  the  position  it  had  taken  on  these  matters.  The 
occasion  was  a  bitter  attack  on  the  French  Army  in  the  Socialist 
paper  Volksstimme.  The  commander  of  the  French  troops  in 
the  Territory  asked  the  commission  for  its  approval  of  the  in- 
stitution of  court-martial  proceedings  against  the  offending 
editor  and  the  commission  offered  no  objection.3  Subsequently, 
in  a  report  to  the  Council,  the  commission  justified  its  action  on 
the  ground  that  it  was  still  dependent  on  the  French  troops,  not 
having  been  able  to  organize  a  police  force  up  to  that  time,  and 
that  it  could  not  safely  allow  aspersions  to  be  cast  on  the  French 
military  forces.  Moreover,  since  the  new  civil  and  criminal 
courts  which  the  commission  was  authorized  to  establish  had  not 
yet  come  into  being,  and  inasmuch  as  there  was  a  strong  proba- 
bility that,  regardless  of  the  merits  of  the  case,  the  offending 
editor  would  have  been  **  ostentatiously  acquitted  "  if  tried  be- 

1  Third  Report  of  S.  B.  G.  C,  op.  Hi.,  no.  5,  p.  284. 

^  Jbid.f  pp.  284-285. 

■Second  Report  of  S.  B.  G.  C,  op.  aV.,  no.  4,  pp.  196-197. 


No.  2]  THE  SAAR  BASIN  GOVERNING  COMMISSION  igj 

fore  a  local  tribunal,  the  commission  had  "  allowed  military 
justice  to  take  its  course  ". 

By  an  order  of  the  tenth  of  June,  admission  to  the  Territory 
was  made  more  difficult,  freedom  of  movement  within  the  Basin 
was  circumscribed,  and  the  commission  began  the  preparation 
of  a  plan  for  controlling  the  movements  of  foreigners.  These 
measures  no  doubt  were  dictated  largely  by  a  desire  to  discourage 
German  propaganda  against  the  French  and  against  the  Gov- 
erning Commission.' 

Quite  as  drastic  was  the  action  taken  by  the  commission  in 
April,  1920,  when  a  railway  strike  appeared  to  be  imminent. 
On  April  28,  the  commission  issued  a  decree  warning  the  popu- 
lace that  in  the  event  of  such  a  strike  a  state  of  siege  would  be 
proclaimed,  and  the  personnel  necessary  to  operate  the  railways 
would  be  obtained  by  requisitioning  civilians.  In  this  case,  the 
commission  may  well  have  been  motivated  by  solicitude  for 
French  military  requirements  as  well  as  by  a  determination  not 
to  permit  any  interruption  of  the  transportation  services  upon 
which  the  food  supply  of  the  Basin's  dense  population  depended. 
Moreover,  the  commission  considered  it  to  be  a  duty  to  provide 
the  railway  facilities  demanded  by  French  exploitation  of  the 
mines.' 

A  measure  of  quite  different  character,  but  one  that  could 
hardly  be  popular,  was  the  decree  of  July  7,  whereby  the 
Governing  Commission  "  intrusted  to  the  Government  of  the 
French  Republic  "  the  duty  of  protecting  the  foreign  interests 
of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Saar  Basin — a  duty  which  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles  had  imposed  upon  the  Governing  Commission 
itself.3  The  contention  of  the  Governing  Commission  that  the 
slender  financial  resources  of  the  Territory  could  not  bear  the 
strain  of  a  separate  diplomatic  establishment  is  less  open  to 
question  than  the  choice  of  France  as  representative  of  the 
Territory.  To  have  intrusted  this  important  function  to  some 
neutral  power  rather  than  to  an  interested  party  would  have 

*  Fourth  Report  of  S.  B.  G.  C,  op.  cii.y  no.  6,  p.  372. 
^  L.  N.  O.  J  y  no.  4,  p.  194. 

*  Fourth  Report  of  S.  B.  G.  C,  op,  cit.^  no.  6,  p.  374. 


1 82  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  QUARTERLY        [Vol.  XXXVI 

been  not  only  more  consonant  with  the  spirit  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  but  also  better  calculated  to  inspire  confidence  in  the 
high  motives  of  the  Governing  Commission. 

It  is  obviously  too  early  as  yet  to  speculate  with  any  assurance 
on  the  future  of  this  first  experiment  in  international  adminis- 
tration under  the  League  of  Nations.  The  period  covered  in 
this  paper,  a  transitional  period  characterized  by  tentative  de- 
cisions and  provisional  measures,  marks  but  the  first  stage  of 
the  experiment.  The  second  stage,  ushered  in  by  the  election 
of  the  first  legislative  assemblies  in  July,  1920,  cannot  now  be 
described.  Yet  it  is  in  this  latter  stage,  which  provides  formal 
opportunities  for  closer  cooperation  and  at  the  same  time  multi- 
plies the  chances  for  friction  between  the  Governing  Commis- 
sion and  the  representatives  of  the  inhabitants,  that  the  test 
will  come.' 

Certain  observations,  however,  may  be  ventured  at  this  time. 
While  it  is  true  that  the  limitations  imposed  by  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  upon  the  authority  of  the  Governing  Commission 
make  it  theoretically  impossible  for  the  commission  to  oppress 
the  native  population,  it  is  no  less  true  that  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  seriously  circumscribe  the  commission's  power  to  pro- 
mote or  even  to  protect  the  material  interests  of  the  inhabi- 
tants. Influential  Germans  dwelling  in  the  Territory  could  not 
be  unaware  of  this,  and  they  were  sure  to  govern  themselves 
accordingly.  Anticipating  their  hostility,  the  commission  as- 
sumed an  attitude  of  firmness  tempered  by  gestures  of  concili- 
ation. It  was  careful  to  keep  the  weapon  of  physical  force  in 
the  background  as  much  as  possible,  but  unfortunately  the 
moral  weapon,  upon  which  it  must  depend  for  any  permanent 
victory  over  the  forces  opposed  to  its  authority,  could  not  be 
used  with  freedom.  Indeed,  to  kill  opposition  with  kindness 
was  a  Herculean  task.  French  ambition,  German  hostility, 
and — one  might  add — the  rigorous  terms  of  the  treaty,  were 
powerful  and  apparently  permanent  factors  militating  against 

^According  to  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  (Part  III,  Sec.  4,  Annex,  paragraphs  23, 
26),  the  Governing  Commission  was  under  obligations,  as  soon  as  the  Territorial  as- 
semblies should  be  convened,  to  consult  them  before  modifications  and  changes  in 
the  laws  might  be  made. 


No.  2]  THE  SAAR  BASIN  GOVERNING  COMMISSION  183 

the  success  of  a  conciliatory  policy.  Tliat  the  commission  tried 
the  methods  of  conference  and  discussion,  reserving  the  weapon 
of  force  for  emergencies,  is  to  its  credit.  That  it  did  not 
always  succeed  by  the  first  method,  and  that  it  too  frequently 
had  to  resort  to  the  second,  is  not  necessarily  to  be  attributed 
either  to  lack  of  sincerity  or  to  failure  of  judgment,  but  rather 
usually  to  a  set  of  circumstances  over  which  it  did  not  have  the 
necessary  control.  If  despite  these  difficulties  the  commission's 
regime  should  ultimately  prove  conducive  to  material  prosperity 
as  well  as  to  civil  liberty,  even  the  most  skeptical  among  us  will 
be  compelled  to  admit  that  the  principle  of  international  admin- 
istration has  been  vindicated  by  an  exceptionally  severe  test. 

F.  M.  Russell. 

Stanford  University. 


